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ment characterized by a centralized review agency that makes
funding recommendations along with decentralized authority for
delivering health care across 10 provinces and three territories. There
has been a signiﬁcant increase in price negotiation for new pharma-
ceuticals in the past 10 years, ﬁrst by individual provinces and now
through a collective price negotiation process called the “Pan-Cana-
dian Pharmaceutical Alliance.” As of February 2014, the Pan-Canadian
Pharmaceutical Alliance has already completed 32 negotiations
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incorporation of economic considerations into price negotiation.
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Canada has a unique system of public drug coverage and
reimbursement characterized by a centralized review agency that
makes funding recommendations along with decentralized
authority for delivering health care across 10 provinces and three
territories. The delivery of health care is guided by principles in
national legislation, with no provision for mandatory universal
coverage of drugs [1]. This has led to each of Canada’s provinces
and territories developing unique systems of public drug insur-
ance within their jurisdictions, with approximately two thirds of
the population relying on either employer-funded private drug
insurance programs or paying out of pocket [2]. The role of
Canada’s federal government in health care delivery is to provide
coverage for speciﬁc populations, such as Canada’s Military and
First Nations and Inuit along with a program of transferring
federal funds to provinces for health care. Unlike other countries
with decentralized authorities such as Sweden and Germany, any
coordination across Canada’s federal, provincial, territorial, and
private insurance programs is entirely voluntary.
Despite these challenges, there have been successful attempts
to develop shared programs and initiatives across federal, pro-
vincial, and territorial jurisdictions. Opportunities to reduce
duplication and leverage shared resources through coordinationamong public insurance programs have led to the development
of two intergovernmental health technology assessment (HTA)
programs, the Common Drug Review (CDR) and the pan-
Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pCODR). Not all public drug
insurance programs participate in these initiatives; the pCODR is
governed by a collaboration of nine provinces (Quebec has never
participated), whereas the CDR additionally involves three terri-
torial and three federal public drug insurance programs. These
processes result in nonbinding recommendations based on evi-
dence of clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and patient
input to help individual provinces and, in the case of the CDR,
federal programs decide what drugs to list. In addition to gains in
efﬁciency, these programs have been viewed as a means to
improve the consistency and quality of the review process,
provide equal access to expert advice, and address differences
in drug coverage among the publicly funded drug plans [3].
Although decisions based on common recommendations are
intended to improve the consistency of listing decisions in
theory, participating drug programs have varying capacity to
implement recommendations, and may have unique demo-
graphics or insurance structures and formulary eligibility that
require contextualizing recommendations to unique reimburse-
ment environments. For example, although several drug plans
extend public coverage to those less likely to have employer-ociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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have universal public coverage programs [2]. Even provinces with
similar drug plans may take unique listing approaches in a given
therapeutic area owing to accumulated differences in priorities
over time or based on differences in affordability or approaches to
the HTA [4]. A recent analysis suggests that the percent agreement
between recommendations and decisions after the implementa-
tion of the CDR ranged from 60.4% to 96.2% across plans [1].
Although there is a growing body of literature on the processes
and effect of drug reviews in Canada [5–11], there is little informa-
tion about the use and effect of price negotiation for new pharma-
ceuticals. Despite this, there has been a signiﬁcant increase in price
negotiation for new pharmaceuticals in the past 10 years [12]. In
this article, we will outline the evolution of price negotiation,
including the development of an interim coordinated process, the
Pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance (PCPA). We will examine the
current and potential role of economic evaluation in this process
and its ﬁt with other HTA and price regulation activity and outline
the challenges and opportunities for formalizing this approach.The Role of Price Negotiation in Canada
Beyond different demographic characteristics and insurance pro-
grams, another factor for apparent inconsistencies in listing deci-
sions across Canadian provinces is the varying capacity to locally
negotiate prices [13]. Although there is national regulation of the
initial price and subsequent price increases for patented medicines
that relies to some degree on international price referencing [14],
provinces regularly negotiate lower conﬁdential prices, even when
provided with a recommendation to “not list” from a national HTA
program because of unfavorable cost-effectiveness [5,13].
The ﬁrst formal price negotiation mechanisms were intro-
duced in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia, where
roughly 50% (Ontario, 38%; British Columbia, 13%) of Canadians
reside (another 25% of the Canadians reside in Quebec). In
Ontario, legislated authority to negotiate prices in 2006 [15],
including changes to generic pricing policies and additional
reforms, contributed to a 5% decrease in drug expenditure growth
and 2-year savings of more than $600 million by 2009 [16].
A similar program in British Columbia, the Business Manage-
ment and Supplier Relations Branch, negotiates the price of newly
approved drugs as a beneﬁt on their public drug plan formularies
[17]. The success of negotiations in Ontario and British Columbia
did not go unnoticed by other jurisdictions, which were unable to
conduct these negotiations because of legal or resource constraints.
Some sought changes to their legal or policy frameworks to allow
them to negotiate better prices (for generic as well as brand drugs)
[18], whereas some federal programs were able to beneﬁt from
policies that pay according to local provincial prices [19].
In the background of these events, the notion of coordinated
price negotiation as a means to improve the consistency of
decisions and leverage buying power had already existed. In
September 2004, Canadian provinces and the federal government
established a ministerial task force to develop and implement a
National Pharmaceuticals Strategy that included (as one of nine
priorities) a commitment to “pursue purchasing strategies to
obtain best prices for Canadians for drugs” [20]. A similar
initiative, the National Immunization Strategy, had earlier been
developed in 2003 and led to the successful implementation of a
bulk purchasing program and lower prices for vaccines [21].The PCPA
Ofﬁcial support for a coordinated approach to price negotiation
for pharmaceuticals was announced in August 2010 after ameeting of Canada’s provincial premiers. Called the PCPA, the
stated aims of this initiative are to “achieve lower drug costs and
consistent pricing, increase access to drug treatment options, and
improve consistency of coverage criteria across Canada” [22].
Other stated aims included capitalizing on the combined buying
power of jurisdictions and reducing the duplication of negotia-
tions to improve the utilization of resources [23]. Currently, all
provinces and territories except Nunavut have agreed to partic-
ipate in the initiative. Federal and private drug insurance plans
are not participating. The private insurance industry is excluded
but has expressed a willingness to participate in this process [24].
What followed this announcement was a test of the feasibility
of a coordinated approach. Within a year of being established, the
initiative had successfully negotiated a price for eculizumab
(Soliris, Alexion, Cheshire, CT), an orphan drug for a rare blood
disorder. By May 2013, the provinces had completed 10 negotia-
tions and 17 negotiations were ongoing [23]. Based on the ﬁrst
nine negotiations, the PCPA had estimated $50 million in avoided
expenditure annually [22]. It is unclear whether these savings are
over and above what would have been achieved through indi-
vidual provincial negotiation.
A formal process for negotiation under the PCPA is still under
development. Negotiations under the PCPA to date, however,
have generally followed these steps [22] (see Fig. 1):1. Provinces decide whether PCPA negotiations should take place
after ﬁnal recommendations are provided from either the CDR or
the pCODR; they may also decide whether it is best to negotiate
individually or collectively decide not to negotiate price at all.2. If interested in PCPA negotiations, a “lead” jurisdiction is
assigned to represent provinces wishing to participate in a
particular negotiation.3. Manufacturers are invited to initiate negotiations with the
lead on behalf of the participating provinces. Negotiation may
include terms and conditions beyond price.4. If an agreement can be reached, a “letter of intent” (LOI) is
signed by the manufacturer and the lead province on behalf of
the participating provinces.5. Manufacturers negotiate product listing agreements (PLAs)
with each participating province/territory on the basis of
terms in the LOI.
As of February 28, 2014, the PCPA has taken decisions on 61
new drugs, opting to jointly negotiate on 43 drug products (32
negotiations completed on 29 products, 12 negotiations under-
way, and 2 negotiations closed), not negotiate on 14, and consider
individual negotiations on 4 (Table 1) [22]. Most of the successful
negotiations have involved oncology products. Although there
are no formal timelines, negotiations appear to take between
several weeks and more than 6 months to ﬁnalize. In July 2013, a
working group of Canada’s premiers provided direction to further
develop this initiative. The PCPA engaged a management con-
sulting ﬁrm to provide advice on a formal model of coordinated
negotiation [22]. This advice is based on a review of the current
approach, international best practices, and stakeholder experi-
ences. The ﬁnal report was released October 15th, 2014 and
contains several recommendations that are considered next
steps toward formalizing this process [22].Challenges and Opportunities for a Formal Approach
to Collective Price Negotiation
Scope of the PCPA and Fit with Other Programs
Although the prices of patented medicines in Canada are regu-
lated through the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board [14], the
Fig. 1 – Current process for collective price negotiation in Canada (from the Council of the Federation [22]).† *Other, products
not currently considered by either the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review or the Common Drug Review (CDR) process
including line extensions, resubmissions for products not previously reviewed by the CDR, currently listed drugs, or drug
classes. †Transparent means that the existence of the application to either drug review or pricing processes is public
knowledge but not necessarily the substance of the application.
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considered a ceiling price from which to begin negotiation, rather
than a means to achieve lower prices [25,18].
Recommendations from either the CDR or the pCODR may
suggest listing at a lower price (if convinced of additional
therapeutic beneﬁt vs. comparators) or to not list at a given price
(if convinced of similar therapeutic beneﬁt to comparators) [26].
The CDR does not specify the extent of the price reduction
governments should seek; in some instances, a recommendation
that the “cost” not exceed that of an identiﬁed comparator
is given.
Although not their explicit purpose, both CDR and pCODR
programs already act as informal mechanisms for price negotia-
tion because manufacturers are able to submit a conﬁdential
price and resubmit a lower conﬁdential price after receiving a
draft recommendation. In the CDR process, there is a special
provision for timely reconsideration if an initial embargoed draft
recommendation is to “do not list” for price reasons [27]. Thisprocess, however, is limited by allowing only a single opportunity
to submit a new price and using only written correspondence.
Also, unlike the PCPA, these HTA bodies are able to focus only on
price and health care costs/cost-effectiveness, and no other cost
offsets and terms that may represent additional value to a
province.
In addition to these activities, the use of drug class reviews
(literature reviews intended to compare beneﬁts, harms, and
costs of all available drugs across a therapeutic area) has
become more commonplace as a means to inform listing
decisions. This includes a Canadian Agency for Drugs and
Technologies in Health (CADTH) “Therapeutic Reviews” pro-
gram [27] and the Ontario Drug Policy Research Network “Drug
Class Reviews” program [28]. CADTH’s reviews are requested by
drug plan managers when recommendations regarding new
drugs are difﬁcult to make or implement because of perceived
inconsistent listing decisions within or across provinces. It is
not known how these initiatives will link to formal PCPA
Table 1 – New drugs subjected to the PCPA process.
Therapeutic
area
Collective negotiation Individual
negotiation
No negotiation
Completed* Underway† Closed‡
Cardiology/
vascular
Efﬁent (prasugrel) Bystolic (nebivolol)
Eliquis (apixaban) Edarbi (azilsartan)
Pradaxa (dabigatran)§ Edarbyclor
(azilsartan/
chlorthalidone)
Xarelto (rivaroxaban)§
Lodalis
(colesevelam)
Samsca (tolvaptan)
Endocrinology Onglyza (saxagliptan) Byetta
(exenatide)
Genotropin
(somatropin)
Victoza
(liraglutide)
Jentadueto
(linagliptin/
saxagliptin)
Genetic disease Kuvan (saproterin)§ Kalydeco (ivacaftor) Soliris (eculizumab)
Soliris (eculizumab)§
Infections and
infectious
disease
Diﬁcid (ﬁdaxomicin) Apprilon
(doxycycline)Stribild (elvitegravir/
cobicistat/ emtricitabine/
tenofovir)
Neurology Gilenya (ﬁngolimod)§ Tecﬁdera (dimethyl
fumarate)
Fycompa
(perampanel)
Fampyra
(fampiridine)Tysabri (natalizumab)
Oncology Adcetris (brentuximab) Erivedge (vismodegib) Aﬁnitor (everolimus)
Aﬁnitor (everolimus) Kadcyla (trastuzumab
emtansine)
Tykerb (lapatinib)
Alimta (pemetrexed) Mekinist (trametinib)
Brilinta (ticagrelor)§ Revlimid
(lenalidomide)
Halaven (eribulin) Taﬁnlar (darafenib)
Inlyta (axitinib)
Mozobil (plerixafor)
Perjeta (pertuzumab)
Sutent (sunitinib)
Treanda (bendamustine)§
Votrient (pazopanib)
Xalkori (crizotinib)
Xtandi (enzulatamide)
Yervoy (ipilimumab)§
Zytiga (abiraterone)
Respiratory Onbrez (indacaterol)§ Esbriet (pirfenidone)
Seebri Breezhaler
(glycopyrronium
bromide)
Other Jakavi (ruxolitinib) Fibristal (ulipristal
acetate)
Humira
(adalimumab)
Benlysta
(belimumab)Oralair (grass pollen
allergen extract) Jetrea (ocriplasmin) Latuda (lurasidone)
Orencia (abatacept) Sublinox (zolpidem)
Rebif (interferon
beta-1a)
Note. Generic names are given in parentheses.
PCPA, Pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance.
* A completed pan-Canadian negotiation refers to those for which a letter of intent (document that outlines the agreed upon terms and
conditions for listing) has been signed between the lead jurisdiction for the negotiation and the manufacturer.
† As of February 28, 2014.
‡ Agreement not reached.
§ The initial nine products negotiated through the PCPA.
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medicines to revisiting previous coverage decisions. The con-
tinued and increased use of drug class reviews may have
implications for this process.The Use of Economic Evaluation and Value-Based Pricing
There are considerable opportunities to increase the use of
economic evaluation and value-based pricing in a formal PCPA
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 8 8 – 8 9 4892process [17]. In Canada, there is mounting evidence that price
rather than the economic consequences of reimbursement has a
much more important role in listing recommendations [5,29].
This is also reﬂected in the current process of collective
negotiation in which prices are negotiated without an explicit
recognition of social value (i.e., share of the economic beneﬁt
that would accrue to consumers and producers) through volume
effects.
The degree of price reduction achieved through negotiation
remains conﬁdential; however, anecdotal information suggests
that it is consistent with 3% to 33% price reductions achieved in
Europe and the United States [30,31]. Although focusing on price
discounts can lower costs, price negotiation without any con-
sideration of overall value may send distorted signals to
innovators and reduce consumer beneﬁts in the long term if
the price and discount do not accurately reﬂect opportunity cost
[32]. This situation may additionally create incentives for
manufacturers to inﬂate prices before negotiation (if discount
asks are anticipated) and unnecessary delays (if discounts are
infeasible).
Assessments of economic impact from the CDR and the
pCODR are not aimed at providing decision makers with a
“reasonable” price but may do so intentionally or unintentionally
through threshold analysis, and acting as a starting point for
price negotiation. Like other similar HTA processes, however,
these reviews focus on technical rather than allocative efﬁciency
[33]. Because focusing on allocative efﬁciency (which requires
simultaneously addressing many different budgets) is likely to be
infeasible in a decentralized environment, a reasonable starting
point could be to develop a formal process for PCPA that bases
price on a more formal consideration of the social surplus (from
price and volume) and how it should be shared [34]. This value-
based approach requires an explicit recognition of what consti-
tutes value, and LOIs that extend to considerations of both
volume and time frame. This can, in turn, assist manufacturers
in making optimal business decisions regarding the future entry
of new products in Canada.
Using a “shared social surplus” approach that requires upfront
agreement regarding what constitutes societal value as a basis
for informing price negotiation is intended to prevent exploita-
tion by monopsony payers and monopoly sellers by clarifying
what innovation is valuable and what it might be worth [17,34].
Without some explicit notion of value (that can be characterized
through conducting economic evaluation that captures beneﬁts
relevant to society), payers can inadvertently reduce societal
beneﬁts through demanding arbitrary levels of price discounts
(rather than discounts that reﬂect relevant costs and beneﬁts) or
through delaying listing decisions. Manufacturers can also reduce
societal beneﬁts through insisting on non–value-based prices
(such as prices based on international referencing or individual
willingness to pay) or hastening listing through political advo-
cacy. Economic evaluation also provides an explicit framework
for valuing resources unrelated to health or the new medicine,
such as investments in clinical research, human resources,
economic development activities, or other cost offsets proposed
by manufacturers. In theory, this approach could bring payers
and sellers closer as a starting point for negotiation and hasten
patient access to new medicines, while promoting consistency in
decisions and incenting innovation.
Equity of Pricing and Access
Joint negotiation is intended to ensure that access and
approaches to pricing are consistent across Canada. However, a
provinces have different formulary populations, revenue bases,
demographics, industry policy, and political priorities [4]. The
province of Nova Scotia, for example, has much higher rates ofchronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) diagnosis than
the national average (7% vs. 4.2%). This means, in theory, that a
new medicine for COPD that is more cost-effective in patients
with severe COPD may be used at higher per capita volumes and
could be of better societal value than if listed in a different
province. Engaging in collective price negotiation on the basis of
product value means that provinces and manufacturers must
think about an “average” return on investment for new listing
decisions.
Complicating this further, because of a historical divergence
of priorities, provinces may have also made variable listing
decisions in the past [4,35]. This means that the value proposition
of any given product may also vary because of differences in
availability of comparators. Similarly, some negotiations will
involve drugs for which other drugs in the same class have
existing PLAs in some provinces but not in others.
Although the current informal PCPA allows for individual
negotiation in situations in which the provinces do not see
coordinated negotiation as feasible, inherent variability could,
in theory, make negotiations complex and may result in a delay
or failure to reach conclusion. The drug ivacaftor (Vertex Phar-
maceuticals), for example, was granted a market license in
November 2012 and recommended for listing at a “substantially
reduced price” by the CDR in March 2013 [36]. Collective negotia-
tion began in July 2013 and led by the province of Alberta. After 8
months of unsettled negotiation, the strain of collective bargain-
ing began to show, with one provincial minister commenting that
he would direct his department to leave the pan-Canadian
process if a deal was not forthcoming [37]. An LOI was signed
with the PCPA in June 2014 [38].
Collective negotiation could also lead to different discounts
than some provinces have obtained historically. What this
means for future prices is uncertain. On the one hand, manu-
facturers with Canadian revenue targets for any new medicine
may be less prepared to provide the same discounts to provinces
other than those that have traditionally been given to provinces
with high utilization rates; in a situation in which listing times
remain the same, this translates into lost revenues. On the other
hand, the increased buying power of a greater number of
provinces and the potential for faster listing decisions may
provide incentives to provide similar or better discounts
afforded to larger provinces.
Any formal process will need to recognize that increased
solidarity and equity in access could result in either a potential
loss or gain in bargaining position by larger provinces and may
depend on individual manufacturers. In addition, the use of
conﬁdential price negotiation and variable participation by prov-
inces may increase the complexity of price negotiation, with
some manufacturers and provinces unaware or not able to learn
of current rebates, creating challenges for budget impact analyses
and other analyses used to support negotiation for new market
entrants.
A key question for smaller provinces will be the beneﬁts and
risks of collective negotiations. If they take part in PCPA nego-
tiations, they may well have access to the same terms negotiated
by multiple jurisdictions but may also face signiﬁcantly more
political pressure to list drugs that they would otherwise have not
added to their formularies. With smaller budgets, these pressures
represent more substantial opportunity costs on other provincial
health (and nonhealth) priorities and diminish the ability for a
smaller province to tailor its health system to the needs and ﬁscal
situation of its population.
Administrative Efﬁciency
The PCPA process is intended to improve efﬁciency because it
could reduce duplication of negotiation and bureaucracy by both
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point, reducing face-to-face meetings across 10 provinces and
ﬁve time zones could considerably reduce time and resource
commitments for each new product. The current process is yet to
resolve this problem because manufacturers are still required to
create individual PLAs with each province after collective nego-
tiation. On its face, this means that both manufacturers and
governments currently have an additional administrative step. It
will be important to consider a process that reduces the burden of
future individual negotiations for all parties as a more permanent
collective negotiation process is developed.
Timelines
The current process targets up to 6 weeks from the time the CDR
or the pCODR issues its recommendation for a notice of intent to
negotiate to be delivered to a manufacturer [22]. There are no set
timelines for the negotiations themselves, which can take any-
where from several weeks to over 6 months, and no timelines for
listing a product on provincial formularies once negotiations
have been completed [22].
The development of a formal process provides an opportunity
to introduce target time frames that consider the needs for timely
decisions and incent manufacturers and public drug plan admin-
istrators to negotiate efﬁciently. Similar target time frames have
been developed for both CDR and pCODR processes, as well as
drug regulators.
Legal Issues
In addition to the issues already identiﬁed, there are several legal
issues that may require consideration as a new process is
developed.
Fairness
The PCPA is not currently governed by a “legal” structure that
gives rise to speciﬁc obligations for manufacturers and the
provinces. In its current form, it has no governing rules that
establish how provincial governments interact with each other or
their obligations. A challenge by manufacturer Boehringer Ingel-
heim against the CDR led to a ﬁnding that the CDR is subject to
“judicial review” [39]. Administrative law principles—such as
fairness—do have application to governmental bodies. Accord-
ingly, a formal PCPA process, depending on how it is constituted,
could be subject to the principles of administrative law, including
a duty of procedural fairness. As a result, manufacturers may be
able to seek judicial review of certain actions of the PCPA, for
example, where there is a lack of due process.
Conﬁdentiality
Conﬁdentiality of information during price negotiation is a
central concern for manufacturers. Companies in negotiations
expect pricing and rebate information to be conﬁdential. Indeed,
the Ontario government faced a challenge from the pharmaceut-
ical industry when the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
was forced to release certain information relating to the receipt of
rebates from manufacturers, sought under a provincial “Freedom
of Information” request [40]. Because of international reference
pricing, disclosure of an effective discounted price in Canada
could have an impact on the price a manufacturer could offer in
other countries despite the different factors at play in those
jurisdictions [41].
In Canada, executing a nondisclosure agreement with a
provincial government in the context of PLA negotiations is
possible. Such an agreement may provide that information
shared in PCPA negotiations and PLAs be kept conﬁdential.
Agreements may also allow information to be shared among allparticipating provinces. A signed PLA, however, could be poten-
tially disclosed, at least in part, because of provincial legislation
permitting access to information. Although some of the informa-
tion found in these PLAs could be subject to certain exemptions,
such as third-party conﬁdential information that could cause the
third party prejudice or harm, there are differences in the
application of provincial laws and exemptions. Whether such
information is accessible will depend on the nature of the
information, the scope of the relevant provincial legislation,
and how those laws have been interpreted.Obligations on Parties during Negotiations
The current PCPA process is predicated on the parties exercising
a measure of good faith. Provinces can sign an LOI on the
completion of a PCPA negotiation but are under no legal obliga-
tion to list the product on the formulary within any particular
time frame. For example, the province of British Columbia
ultimately decided not to list the ﬁrst collectively negotiated drug
(ecalizumab) at the discounted price [42]. Manufacturers have no
redress for delays in listing, or in a circumstance in which a
province fails to list a product at all, despite having signed an LOI.
This is because there are typically no agreed upon listing dead-
lines, and the LOI is not, in any event, legally binding. Although
provinces acknowledge that an LOI does not guarantee an
eventual listing agreement [22], this nonetheless creates signiﬁ-
cant uncertainty for manufacturers who have to agree on a price
point without having any commitment with regard to the volume
of sales. It also makes it difﬁcult for manufacturers to accurately
forecast sales and revenues. There is also nothing that legally
precludes provinces from negotiating different terms from the
LOI, which further adds to manufacturers’ uncertainty. Solutions
to address or minimize this uncertainty, either through creating
legally binding agreements or service performance guarantees,
should be explored in the context of developing a formal PCPA
process.Implications and Lessons Learned for Other
Jurisdictions
The current PCPA process highlights the need for potential
change going forward. Such change could include a framework
for negotiations with clear priority setting criteria (i.e., what is
amenable to negotiation), timelines for negotiations and listing
deadlines and incentives for participation, and concluding listing
agreements once negotiations have been completed. The process
would also beneﬁt from the allocation of adequate resources to
avoid unnecessary delay. In addition, there should be clear roles,
responsibilities, and obligations for those participating.
Establishing a formal PCPA process should lead to revisiting
the roles of existing HTA mechanisms to ensure an efﬁcient
process. Most importantly, the formal process should exist within
a legal framework and be developed in consultation with all
stakeholders affected. Consultations have begun and have
included dialogue with manufacturers, patients, and other stake-
holders. This ongoing dialogue on the PCPA process, including
the appropriate use of economic evaluation in price negotiation,
presents an important opportunity to align industry and health
system goals in regard to the introduction of new medicines in
Canada.
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